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The Secured Creditor Exemption: A Fleeting Factor
m Lender Liability Analysis Under CERCLA
I.

INTRODUCTION

The disposal of hazardous materials is a national problem. The
horrifying discoveries at Love Canal sparked nationwide concern over
the implications of hazardous waste disposal. 1 Public protests intensified over time to encourage governmental intervention and to demand
effective treatment of the environmental problems that pollute every
state in the nation. 2 In response, Congress enacted the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA
or Superfund) 3 to facilitate the cleanup of hazardous waste sites as well
as to provide the necessary financing.'
The purpose of CERCLA is two-fold: first, to promptly and effectively cleanup hazardous waste sites, and second, to hold responsible
parties liable for cleanup costs.'1 Responsible parties include current
"owners and operators" 6 of a facility; 7 prior owners and operators who
1. Hooker Chemical and Plastics Corporation had dumped 21,800 tons of toxic wastes into
the Love Canal. L. Gruson, Ex-Love Canal Families Get Payments, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1985,
at B I, col. I. Years after the disposal, residents of the Love Canal neighborhood began to suffer
physical injuries ranging from a variety of cancers and mental retardation to persistent rashes and
migraine headaches. A lawsuit brought by former residents against the company was settled for
$20 million. /d.
2. The General Accounting Office of the United States has found as many as 425,380 potential hazardous waste sites that require cleanup. GAO Finds 425,380 Potential Superfund Sites:
Florio Hits EPA for Delays in Site Assessments, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2043 (Jan. 22, 1988). The
cost of cleaning up only 2,500 or I o/o of these sites is estimated at more than $22 billion. /d.
3. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified in part as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
9601-9657 (1988)).
4. Personal Liability for Hazardous Waste Cleanup: An Examination of CERCLA Section
107, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 643, 649-50 (1986). The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) was enacted to fill in the gaps left under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) that Congress enacted in 1976. /d.
CERCLA, which contained a $1.6 billion Superfund to finance the cleanup of hazardous
waste sites, was due to expire in 1985, but the Senate passed SSt to re-authorize CERCLA and to
increase the Superfund to $7.5 billion. Senate Passes $7.5 Billion Superfund Bill with Tax Administration Threatened to Veto, 16 Env't Rep. (BNA) 931 (Sep. 27, 1985).
5. United States v. Reilly Tar & Chern. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982).
6. An individual or entity is considered an owner or operator, "in the case of any facility,
title or control of which was conveyed due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandonment, or similar means to a unit of State or local government, any person who owned, operated, or
otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately beforehand." 42 U.S.C. §
9601 (20)(A)(iii).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l). CERCLA defines facility as:
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owned or operated any facility at the time "hazardous substances" 8
were disposed of; 9 any person who generates or arranges for disposal,
treatment, or transport of hazardous substances/ 0 and any person who
transports hazardous substance for which there is a release or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs. 11 Responsible parties are liable for all costs of removaP 2 or remedial action/3 damages for the injury, loss, or destruction of natural resources;
and the cost of any health assessment or health effects study carried out
under CERCLA. 14 Certain parties, however, are exempt from liability
under the statute. 16 This note will examine the secured creditor exemp(A) any building structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any
pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or
(B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed
of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but does not include any consumer product in consumer use or any vessel.
42 u.s.c. § 9601(9).
8. Hazardous substances include:
(A) any substance designated pursuant to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of Title 33, (B) any
element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance designated pursuant to section 9602
of this title, (C) any hazardous waste having the characteristics identified under or
listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 6921]
(but not including any waste the regulation of which under the Solid Waste Disposal
Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 6901 et seq.] has been suspended by Congress), (D) any toxic
pollutant listed under section 1317(a) of Title 33, (E) any hazardous air pollutant
listed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 7412], and (F) any imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture with respect to which the Administrator has taken action pursuant to section 2606 of Title 15. The term does not include
petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance under subparagraphs (A) through
(F) of this paragraph, and the term does not include natural gas, natural gas liquids,
liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and
such synthetic gas).
42 u.s.c. § 9601(14).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4). Response costs include the cost of all removal or remedial action
taken by the government or an Indian tribe; any other necessary response costs incurred by any
person consistent with the national contingency plan; damages for injury, destruction, or loss of
natural resources; and the costs of any health assessment or health effects study. 42 U.S.C. §
9607(a)(4)(A)-(D).
12. Removal means the cleanup of "released hazardous substances from the environment,
[and] such actions as may be necessary . . . in the event of the threat of release of hazardous
substances." 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (23). Removal also includes actions necessary to "monitor, assess,
and evaluate the release or threat of release . . . [and] the disposal of removed material [and other
actions] necessary to prevent, minimize or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to
the environment . . . . " 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23).
13. Remedial action includes those actions "consistent with permanent remedy taken instead
of or in addition to removal actions." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(D).
15. There is an exemption for innocent land owners, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3), and an exemp-
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tion 16 of CERCLA and the application of this exemption in the case of
United States v. Fleet Factors Corp. 17
The main question examined in Fleet Factors was whether a
lender removes himself from the protection of the secured creditor exemption by possessing the ability to participate in the management of
the borrower. More specifically, the question examined was whether
the standard of liability should be based on capacity or ability to influence, instead of the previously used standard of liability based on actual
participation. 18 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concluded that a lender who possesses the capacity or ability to participate
in the management of the borrower is liable under CERCLA. This
note will show that (1) the Eleventh Circuit used a nebulous test in
determining the scope of the secured creditor exemption, (2) subsequent
application of the test will be detrimental to the environment and contradict the goals of CERCLA, and (3) alternative tests before Congress
and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) discredit the credibility of the Fleet Factors test.

A.

The Secured Creditor Exemption

The secured creditor exemption excludes from the definition of
owner and operator "any person, who, without participating in the
management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily
to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility." 19 Originally this
exemption was not included in CERCLA. 20 However, Congress added
the exemption to protect from liability title holders who do not participate in the management of the facility and who are not affiliated in any
way with the leasing or operating of the facility. 21

tion for secured creditors, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A). This note will discuss only the latter.
16. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
17. 724 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Ga. 1988), affd, remanded, 901 F.2d 1550 (lith Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 752 (1991).
18. See United States v. Mirabile, No. 84-2280, slip op. at 3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 1985).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (20)(A)(iii) (1988).
20. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1558 n.IJ (lith Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, IllS. Ct. 752 (1991) (citing S. 1480, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 2 SENATE
COMM. ON ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC WoRKS, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., I A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF CERCLA 470 (Comm. Print 1983)).
21. ld. (citing remarks of Rep. Harsha, reprinted in 2 SENATE CoMM. ON ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC WORKS, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., 2 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF CERCLA 945
(Comm. Print 1983)).
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Lender Liability Before Fleet Factors

Prior to the enactment of environmental statutory relief, the common law doctrines of toxic tort and nuisance were the only remedies
available for injuries resulting from improper hazardous waste disposal.22 In response to public outrage and the enormous cleanup costs of
innumerable23 contaminated sites around the country, the government
created CERCLA and gave the EPA the authority to enforce CERCLA regulations.
CERCLA is armed with a large bore barrel of joint and several
liability that fires with minimal precision, holding its victims strictly
liable. While this method of broad sweeping liability serves to finance
costly cleanup activities, it also causes extreme hardship to the parties
involved. Recently, this view has allowed the courts to impose liability
on lenders who foreclose on secured property that has been poisoned by
previous owners. 2 ' In Fleet Factors, the Eleventh Circuit developed a
test that will further expand lender liability under the fa~ade of "cleaning up the environment," while neglecting the fundamental principle of
causationally-linked liability.
II.

A.

UNITED STATES v. FLEET FACTORS CoRP.

The Facts

In 1976, Fleet Factors Corp. (Fleet) entered into a factoring
agreement with a cloth printing facility.~& Fleet advanced funds against
the assignment of the facility's accounts receivable and, in return, obtained a security interest in the facility and all of its equipment, fixtures, and inventory. 26 The cloth printing facility filed for bankruptcy
under Chapter Eleven in 1979 and in December 1981 was adjudicated
as bankrupt under Chapter Seven. 27 During this time, the factoring
agreement continued under court order. On February 27, 1981, the facility discontinued operations and began to liquidate its inventory. 28
Fleet foreclosed on some of the facility's inventory and equipment
22. Ginsberg & Weiss, Common Law Liability for Toxic Tort: A Phantom Remedy, 9 HoFL. REV. 859, 864 (1981). These common law remedies have proven ineffective because of
various legal obstacles that prevent recovery. ld. at 920-28.
23. See supra note 2.
24. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579-80 (D. Md. 1986).
25. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1553 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
26. Id.
27. ld.
28. ld.
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in May 1982. 29 Fleet then hired a professional liquidator to auction off
the collateral. After the auctioned collateral was removed (under the
responsibility of the purchasers), Fleet hired a third party to remove
the remaining collateral and to clean the premise. 30
The EPA inspected the facility on January 20, 1984, and incurred
costs of nearly $400,000 in responding to the toxic chemicals and asbestos contamination at the site. The cloth printing facility failed to pay
taxes on the property; therefore, the facility was conveyed to the state of
Georgia at a foreclosure sale on July 7, 1987. 31
The government sued both the owners of the cloth printing facility
and Fleet Factors under CERCLA to recover the cleanup costs. 32 The
district court granted the government's motion for partial summary
judgment on the liability of the owners of the facility but denied the
government's motion for partial summary judgment on the liability of
Fleet. 33 Likewise, the court denied Fleet's cross motion for summary
judgment because genuine issues of material fact existed concerning
Fleet's activities at the facility. Fleet's request of interlocutory appeal
was granted. 34 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's holding and remanded the case for further proceedings. 311

B.

The "Capacity to Influence" Test

To achieve the "overwhelmingly remedial" goal of CERCLA, the
Eleventh Circuit found Fleet potentially liable under the following test:
[A] secured creditor may incur section 9607(a)(2) liability, without
being an operator, by participating in the financial management of a
facility to a degree indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's
treatment of hazardous wastes. It is not necessary for the secured
creditor actually to involve itself in the day-to-day operations of the
facility in order to be liable . . . . Nor is it necessary for the secured
creditor to participate in the management decisions relating to hazardous waste. Rather, a secured creditor will be liable if its involvement with the management of the facility is sufficiently broad to support the inference that it could affect hazardous waste disposal
decisions if it so chose. 88

The "capacity to influence" test employs a standard of ability to
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

/d.
This was accomplished by the end of December 1983. ld. at 1552-53.
/d. at 1553.
/d.
/d. at 1556.
/d. at 1553.
/d. at 1560.
/d. at 1557-58 (footnotes omitted).
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influence instead of a standard of action. This standard IS difficult to
apply in practice, is impossible to measure, and sets no guidelines for
future credit transactions.

C.

Reasoning Used by the Eleventh Circuit

After refusing the government's argument that Fleet was liable
under 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(1), 37 the Eleventh Circuit addressed Fleet's
liability under 9607(a)(2). Acknowledging that Fleet carried the burden
of establishing its entitlement to the secured creditor exemption, the
court viewed the critical issue to be whether Fleet participated in the
management sufficiently to incur liability under the statute. 38
The Eleventh Circuit expressly rejected the test previously used by
some district courts which differentiated between "permissible participation in the financial management of the facility and impermissible
participation in the day-to-day or operational management of a facility."39 The Eleventh Circuit found this "construction of the statutory
exemption too permissive towards secured creditors who are involved
with toxic waste facilities." 40 To achieve the goals 41 of CERCLA, the
court reasoned that "ambiguous statutory terms should be construed to
37. This section holds the owner and operator of a vessel or facility subject to liability. Under
CERCLA, a state or local government that has acquired title to a facility due to tax delinquency
(like the present case), or similar means, is not liable. Instead, the statute places liability on any
person who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately beforehand. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (20)(A)(iii) (1988).
38. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1555.
39. /d. at 1556. (citing United States v. Mirabile, No. 84-2280, slip op. at 3 (E.D. Pa. Sept.
6, 1985)) ("participation which is critical is participation in operational, production, or waste
disposal activities"); accord United States v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854, 866 (D. Del.
1989); Rockwell Int'l v. IU Int'l Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1384 , 1390 (N.D. Ill. 1988). In Mirabile, a
Pennsylvania federal district court held that a lender must be involved in the day-to-day operational affairs of the borrower before it can be held liable. Mirabile, No. 84-2280, at 3. Mere
financial ability to control waste disposal practices was not considered sufficient for the imposition
of liability. /d. The court examined the legislative history, which defined operator to be a person
who is carrying out operational functions for the owner or the facility pursuant to an appropriate
agreement. /d. This test enables both lender and debtor to know the extent of their respective
liabilities and responsibilities governing the management of hazardous waste. While some claim
that the "operational test" may allow creditors to indirectly manage the "affairs" of the debtor and
at the same time dodge the liability bullet, these concerns appear minimal because of the well
publicized examples of hazardous waste polluters currently experiencing the bankruptcy blues.
40. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557. To date, the Ninth Circuit is the only other federal
court of appeals to address the parameters of the "participating in the management" phrase. Bergsoe Metal Corp. v. East Asiatic Co., 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990). In Bergsoe, the Ninth Circuit
refused to delineate specific guidelines for subsequent interpretation of the secured creditor exemption but noted that "there must be some actual management of the facility before a secured creditor will fall outside the exception." /d. at 672 (emphasis in original).
41. The goals of CERCLA are to cleanup hazardous waste sites and to hold responsible
parties liable for the cost. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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favor liability for the costs incurred by the government in responding to
the hazards at such facilities." 42

Ill.

ANALYSIS

After opening the "pro-liability" door with the knock of ambiguity, the Eleventh Circuit turns the key of plain language to lock shut
this same door from the district courts' so-called broad interpretation.4 3
The Eleventh Circuit construed the district courts' interpretation"" as
"ignor[ing] the plain language of the exemption and render[ing] it
meaningless. " 411

A.

Plain Language of the Secured Creditor Exemption

"It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must . . . be
sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if it is plain, the
sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms." 46 The
plain language of 9607(a)(2) seemingly absolves liability from the secured creditor who holds indicia of ownership in the facility without
participating in the management of the facility.4 7 The district court's
interpretation more closely parallels the plain language of the statute
than that of the court of appeals.4 8 The exemption specifically excludes
from the definition of owner or operator any person who, without participating in the management of the facility, holds indicia of ownership
to protect a security interest in the facility. 49 Therefore, secured credi42. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557.
43. The court's analysis here is suspect. First, the court labels the statutory terms as ambiguous and therefore reasons that the terms "must be construed to favor liability for the costs incurred
by the government in responding to the hazards at such facilities." United States v. Fleet Factors
Corp., 901 F.2d 1550,1557 (lith Cir. 1990), cert. denied, IllS. Ct. 752 (1991). This proliability presumption evolves from the remedial goals of CERCLA. Next, the court invokes the
plain meaning doctrine and applies it to the same statutory terms it had previously labeled ambiguous. /d. This contradiction appears to be nothing more than judicial reasoning used to reach a
desired end by simply brushing the issue of causation under a remedial rug.
44. The Eleventh Circuit termed the district court's interpretation as awkward, "essentially
requir[ing] a secured creditor to be involved in the operations of the facility in order to incur
liability." Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557.
45. /d.
46. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
47. This is true as long as ownership is held to protect the security interest and not used as
an investment.
48. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that those involved in
the operations of a facility are already liable as operators under the statute. /d. Therefore, the
court concluded that, "[h]ad Congress intended to absolve secured creditors from ownership liability it would have done so." /d. This is precisely what Congress did by exempting secured creditors
from liability as long as they didn't participate in the management of the facility.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(10)(A) (1988).
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tors who do not cross the "participating in the management" line are
not considered either operators or owners for liability purposes. In
other words, Congress absolves secured creditors from ownership liability as long as they remain within the permissible boundaries.

B.

Can the Secured Creditor Exemption Survive Fleet Factors?

The Eleventh Circuit's holding severely limits the scope of the secured creditor exemption, if not eliminating it completely. Under the
court's view, a secured creditor can incur CERCLA liability by merely
participating in the financial management of a facility if participation
includes the capacity to influence the debtor's treatment of hazardous
waste. 110 The Eleventh Circuit's rationale for narrowing the secured
creditor exemption was to force creditors to thoroughly investigate the
potential debtor's waste treatment systems and policies. If the potential
creditor finds that the debtor's systems and policies do not meet the
requirements set forth in the appropriate environmental statutes, the
creditor will require the potential debtor to seek money from another
source, to bear the cost of possible CERCLA liability weighed into the
terms of the agreement, or to reconstruct its hazardous waste policies
and systems to the satisfaction of the creditor.
The Eleventh Circuit's belief that secured creditors should police
hazardous waste policy and management rests on supply and demand
principles coupled with unjust enrichment. By holding lenders liable,
the debtors of the world will be required to comply with the regulatory
restrictions mandated by Congress or they will not obtain the financial
support they need to operate. While these arguments appear theoretically sound, the practical application and consequence of a capacity to
influence test is not nearly as persuasive. These results are not consistent with the goals of CERCLA. Little justification exists for making
the secured creditor a monitor of hazardous waste systems and
policies. 111
50. The court noted that "a secured creditor will be liable if its involvement with the management of the facility is sufficiently broad to support the inference that it could affect hazardous
waste disposal decisions if it so chose." Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558.
51. Under the current application of environmental regulations, financial institutions are required to perform environmental audits on a routine basis. There is no express statutory language
that requires such audits. However, recent federal court decisions holding lenders potentially liable
for cleanup costs has forced good business practice to include environmental reports. These audits
can range from $10,000 to $50,000, or more, per audit. When conducted several times during the
life of the loan, the increased transactional costs are tremendous. While a large portion of these
costs will be shifted to the borrower, this increase disproportionately effects small business lenders
and bluntly applies punitive measures on borrowers as a whole. The very possibility that the
debtor's property may become polluted, which in turn can cause the lender to lose the entire value
of the loan, is substantial incentive for the lender to conduct his affairs in an environmentally
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The Effect of a Capacity to Influence Test

The test laid down by the Eleventh Circuit is extremely vague and
will most likely frustrate the very goals it purports to achieve. Capacity112 to influence113 can be interpreted in a myriad of ways. 114 Arguably,
every lender could be held liable under the capacity to influence theory.n Until the courts have created a workable definition of this liability based on the capacity to influence, creditors will have a difficult
time structuring their transactions to avoid potential liability. 116 This
will force creditors to deny potential debtors the right to acquire necessary funds if the slightest risk of CERCLA liability is present, since the
court will find that a lender who is aware of a debtor's potential CERCLA liability has the capacity to influence hazardous waste management. While the potential liability to lenders is devastating, 117 the effect
of potential lender liability will also have a crippling ripple effect on
farms and small businesses that ordinarily would be eligible for financial advancement (such as auto shops, gas stations, and dry cleaners). 118
Also, "[i]ncreased caution on lenders' part will probably result in more
bankruptcies, since helping a borrower overcome financial difficulties
will seldom be worth the risk of cleanup liability." 119
As the number of bankruptcies increase, the number of responsible
parties that are financially capable of bearing the burden of cleanup
sensitive manner.
52. The applicable definition of capacity is "the legal authority or competence." WEBSTER's
Nt:W WoRLD DICTIONARY 209 (2d ed. 1982).
53. Influence means "the ability of a person or group to produce effects indirectly by means
of power based on wealth, high position, etc." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 722 (2d ed.
1982).
54. For example, every secured creditor theoretically possesses the ability to influence the
borrower to the extent that the lender has extended credit.
55. For a review of commercial lending law in this context, see Comment, When a Security
Becomes a Liability: Claims Against Lenders in Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38 HASTINGS L.J.
1261, 1271 (1987).
56. If room for error is considered, the creditors will be forced to err on the safe side of nonparticipation.
57. Steven A. Seelig, Director of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's Division of
Liquidation (FDIC), recently asked Senator Jake Garn (R-Utah) to "tighten language clarifying
the agencies' immunity and make it transferrable to asset purchasers." FDIC, Resolution Trust
Corp. Seek Protection in Senate Bill Limiting Exposure Under CERCLA, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA)
533-34 (July 27, 1990). Because of the Fleet Factors ruling, the FDIC could be liable for clean
up costs on properties it holds for liquidation. FDIC has identified approximately 270 assets held
by the agency for liquidation that have potentially serious hazardous waste problems. The book
value of these properties is approximately $365 million. Estimates for cleanup on these properties
may be more than three times their market value. /d.
58. Bankers, Lawyers, Businesses Endorse LaFalce CERCLA Lender Liability Legislation,
21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 344 (June 15, 1990).
59. Fleet Factors Complains to Supreme Court That CERCLA Ruling Disrupts Commercial Lending, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1116-17 (Oct. 5, 1990).
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costs decrease. The public is therefore required to absorb the cleanup
costs, 60 frustrating the goal of CERCLA. 61

D.

Possible Solutions to the Overly Broad Test in Fleet Factors

1.

Legislative resolution

Senator Jake Garn (R-Utah) introduced Senate Bill 2827 62 in
March 1990, but the bill was stalled because environmentalists successfully argued that the measure was too broad and represented a sweeping bailout for banks. 63 Senator Garn has subsequently revised his proposal to address the controversial decision in Fleet Factors. 64 The
proposed legislation limits the liability of depository institutions, other
mortgage lenders, and the federal banking agencies for environmental
releases they did not cause. The bill also protects lenders if they acquire, control, or hold property in a fiduciary capacity. 611 Further, it
replaces the strict liability scheme currently used under CERCLA by
limiting lenders' liability to the actual benefit conferred on them by an
environmental cleanup operation. 66 Under the bill, liability is only triggered if the institution causes a release or if the institution has actual
knowledge that a hazardous material is being stored on the property
and fails to take reasonable actions necessary to prevent its release.
Small Business Committee Chairman John LaFalce (D-NY) is
sponsoring House Resolution 449467 which excludes from liability both
lenders when they foreclose on contaminated property and fiduciaries
that take title or control of property as part of a trust or estate. 68
LaFalce's attempt to get the bill passed in 1990 failed. However, both
the Garn bill and the LaFalce bill were reintroduced to Congress in
March 1991. 69
60. When the responsible parties cannot pay for the cleanup, the government uses the money
from the Superfund, which is supported by tax dollars from big industry and from the public at
large.
61. Under this scenario, remedial response to Superfund sites will be inadequate due to lack
of funding. The goals of CERCLA will be frustrated because Superfund sites will not be cleaned
up, and those sites that are recovered will be financed by the Superfund itself (the taxpayers).
62. S. 2827, JOist Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CoNG. Rn:. 9217 (1990).
63. Garn, Lautenberg Drafting Compromise Bill to Shield Banks from Superfund, 11 Inside EPA Weekly Rep. (Inside Wash.) No. 41, at 6 (Oct. 12, 1990).
64. Utah Senator Submits Lender Liability Bill: House Measure Continues to Gather Sponsors, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 482 (July 13, 1990).
65. ld.
66. ld.
67. H.R. 4494, JOist Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CoNG. REc. 1503 (1990).
68. Bankers, Lawyers, Businesses Endorse LaFalce CERCLA Lender Liability Legislation,
21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 344 (June 15, 1990).
69. S. 3279, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CoNG. REr:. 3279 (1991) (Garn Bill); H.R. 1769,
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Legislative correction will probably be the most effective and efficient means of revitalizing the secured creditor exemption under CERCLA. A potential problem, though, is that the legislative body is extremely sensitive to political lobbying and to influence from various
groups. This sensitivity, however, can help create a bill that accomplishes the overall goals of cleaning up the environment while at the
same time allowing the financial community to provide adequate services to the struggling economy.

2.

Administrative rule-making resolution

James Strock, EPA Assistant Administrator for Enforcement, told
a House panel that a rule to preserve the secured creditor exemption
under CERCLA is under development. 70 He reported:
In sum, we believe that a rule or legislation that defines a 'safe harbor' in which lenders could take responsible actions without incurring
CERCLA liability is a valuable approach. Although EPA favors an
administrative rule-making rather than a legislative attempt to clarify
the status, if Congress concludes that legislation is necessary, EPA
would not oppose legislation that is narrowly focused on the lender
liability issue and includes the provisions mentioned. 71

The proposed rule defines the term "participating in the management" and also describes actions that would invoke liability on secured
lenders. 72 Since the EPA is experienced in promulgating rules governing the environment, courts tend to take the slightest ambiguities in
102nd Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REc. 1769 (1991) (LaFalce Bill). The Garn bill is very similar
to Senate Bill 2827, but does contain certain modifications made after testimonies received during
banking committee hearings on Senate Bill 2827. 137 CoNG. REc. 3279 (1991). The LaFalce bill
however has undergone considerable modification and is based on a draft rule prepared by the
EPA on the secured creditor exemption. 137 CoNG. REC. 1769 (1991). For a further discussion of
the proposed EPA rule, see infra note 72.
70. EPA Official Tells House Panel of Shift in Policy Towards Lenders, CERCLA Liability,
21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 756 (Aug. 10, 1990).
71. /d.
72. Participation in the management of a facility is defined as "actual operational participation by the lender, and does not include the mere capacity or ability to influence facility operations." EPA Draft Proposal Defining Lender Liability Issues Under The Secured Creditor Exemption of Cercla, 21 Env't Rep. (BN A) 1162, 1165 (Oct. 12, 1990). Although this rule reflects
the "operational test," some serious procedural defects may decrease its enforceability. First, since
the EPA is promulgating the rule as an interpretative rule, it may give guidance to courts, but it is
not legally binding on them. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977). Second, the
proposed rule does not discuss the applicability of the rule in citizen suits. Therefore, the rule will
be used when the EPA is a party. If, however, the suit involves a "citizen suit plaintiff," the rule
could be deemed irrelevant. Another potential problem is that an agency retains the right to
change or discontinue following a rule that it has promulgated. American Petroleum lnst. v.
United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 906 F.2d 729, 738 n.ll (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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the rules and resolve them consistent to the broad reaching goals set
forth by the EPA. This tends to result in far-reaching decisions that
transform slight ambiguities into subjectively-based monumental decisions never contemplated by those who drafted the rules. 73

3.

judicial resolution

Judicial resolution is arguably the most inefficient method of remedying the present issue. Realistically, however, the courts are where
the issue will be debated during the next several months. In their efforts to resolve lender liability issues, courts should take note of the
current legislative and administrative efforts to address the role of the
secured creditor exemption under CERCLA. Sweeping statutory exemptions under the rug with the "overwhelmingly remedial goals" of
CERCLA is no longer justifiable. Clearly, such results were never the
intent of the statute. Until the statute is amended or altered, the courts
should apply the actual participation test discussed in Mirabile. 14 The
Mirabile test more closely reflects both the current intent of Congress
and the EPA regarding the secured creditor exemption.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The "capacity to influence" test used by Eleventh Circuit in Fleet
Factors is vague and counterproductive to the goals of CERCLA. Until
the secured creditor exemption is clarified by Congress or the EPA,
courts should apply the "actual participation standard" (being involved
in the day-to-day operations of the facility) as discussed in Mirabile.n

Bret W. Reich

73. Fleet Factors is a classical example. Here, broad judicial interpretation of CERCLA's
goals has essentially eliminated any protection previously intended in the secured creditor exemption. Thus, while construing those goals, one judicial eye remains wide open to the light of liability
while the other is blinded by "overwhelming" statutory goals. This judicial vision purports to
follow congressional intent but may be nothing more than a respectful wink.
74. United States v. Mirabile, No. 84-2280, slip op. at 3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 1985).
75. /d.

